Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information and Sticky Prices by M'Baye, Cheick Kader
Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information
and Sticky Prices
Cheick Kader M’Baye
To cite this version:
Cheick Kader M’Baye. Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information and Sticky Prices.
Working paper GATE 2012-02. 2012. <halshs-00677671>
HAL Id: halshs-00677671
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00677671
Submitted on 9 Mar 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.






























Inflation	  Targeting	  under	  Heterogeneous	  
Information	  and	  Sticky	  Prices	  
	  
	  
















































GATE	  Groupe	  d’Analyse	  et	  de	  Théorie	  Économique	  Lyon-­‐St	  Étienne	  
	  
93,	  chemin	  des	  Mouilles	  	  69130	  Ecully	  –	  France	  
Tel.	  +33	  (0)4	  72	  86	  60	  60	  	  
Fax	  +33	  (0)4	  72	  86	  60	  90	  
	  
6,	  rue	  Basse	  des	  Rives	  42023	  Saint-­‐Etienne	  cedex	  02	  –	  France	  	  
Tel.	  	  +33	  (0)4	  77	  42	  19	  60	  
Fax.	  +33	  (0)4	  77	  42	  19	  50	  
	  
Messagerie	  électronique	  /	  Email	  :	  	  gate@gate.cnrs.fr	  
Téléchargement	  /	  Download	  :	  http://www.gate.cnrs.fr	  	  –	  Publications	  /	  Working	  Papers	  
	  
	  





Under what conditions should a central bank adopt an inflation targeting regime?
This is the main question we address in this paper. A large part of the literature
puts forward that these regimes should have to be adopted, as they yield higher
macroeconomic performances. We analyze the issue of optimal inflation targeting in
a new theoretical framework, which conciliates the interaction between the degree of
price stickiness, and the degree of strategic complementarities in firms’ price setting.
We show that adopting a target for inflation, crucially depends on the sequential
but complementary importance of the model’s parameters. In particular, we show
that strategic complementarities appear to be the first driving force. When they
are low, the central bank must adopt an inflation targeting regime whatever the
importance of other parameters in the model. By contrast, when the degree of
strategic complementarities is high, adopting a target for inflation depends on both
the degree of price stickiness and the precision of central bank’s information about
∗This paper has been written when I was visiting the School of Public Policy (SPP) of George Mason
University (Washington, USA). I am particularly grateful to professors Andrew Hughes Hallett, Camille
Cornand, and Jean Pierre Allegret for their useful comments, as well as all participants at SPP and
GATE-LSE seminars. All remaining errors are my own.
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Supe´rieure de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France.
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the fundamentals of the economy. When prices are flexible enough, adopting an
inflation target is never optimal. However, when prices are strongly sticky, and the
central bank holds precise information about the fundamentals, the central bank
should adopt an explicit target for inflation.
JEL Classification : E52; E58; E61; E31.
Keywords : Inflation targeting, price stickiness, heterogeneous information,
strategic complementarities.
1 Introduction
One of the major observed trends in the practice of central banks over the last two decades
is their evolution towards greater transparency. This shift from their traditional secrecy
to greater transparency concerns all types of regimes that central banks adopted.
Geraats [10] defines transparency as the absence of any asymmetric information between
the central bank and the private sector1. Under transparency, both the central bank
and the private sector share the same information and face the same uncertainty about
the economy. In this new and influential practice of monetary policy, inflation targeting
central banks emerge on average as the most transparent central banks2.
Inflation targeting regime has aroused a great interest in modern monetary policy,
and has been adopted by more than twenty developed and developing countries. The
reasons commonly put forward in the literature, are the fact that these regimes yield the
greatest macroeconomic performances. Yet, a part of the literature on inflation targeting
including Friedman and Kuttner [9] criticizes this monetary regime arguing that, it cares
more about inflation stabilization and therefore, leads to greater output variability which
may be harmful to social welfare. Do these regimes really matter in terms of global
welfare, and under what conditions should a central bank explicitly announce a target
1Geraats also identifies five aspects of central banks’ transparency which are briefly: political trans-
parency (about policy objectives and targets), economic transparency (about forecasts and used models),
policy transparency (about decisions and future policy inclination), procedural transparency (about strat-
egy and voting) and operational transparency (about policy implementation and control errors).
2See Geraats [11] for more details about the trends in central banks’ transparency.
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for inflation? The aim of this paper is precisely to analyze the welfare implications of
adopting an inflation target in a new keynesian’s sticky prices framework a` la Calvo
[5], when the economy is characterized by heterogeneous information among firms and
strategic complementarities in price setting. Our approach focuses on the impact of the
interaction between both sticky prices and strategic complementarities, to assess whether
a central bank must optimally implement an inflation targeting as a framework for its
monetary policy. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explicitly analyze
welfare effects of inflation targeting regimes in such a theoretical setup.
Our motivation to analyze inflation targeting in such a framework is justified by the
following observations.
First, the literature in monetary theory has shown that monetary policy has real effects
on the short run’s economic activity, and puts forward two main arguments to explain
these real short run effects. The first argument in the line of Phelps [18] and Lucas
[16], explains this phenomenon by the fact that economic agents have heterogeneous and
imperfect information about the state of the economy, while the second argument in
the spirit of Taylor [26] and Calvo [5], stresses rigidities in the adjustment of prices or
wages to explain these real effects. The argument of distortion due to heterogeneous and
imperfect information has been criticized in the empirical literature, because it does not
explain the persistence of fluctuations observed in the business cycle despite the quite rapid
availability of perfect information about macro data. Therefore, the second part of the
literature argues that these short-term real effects are mainly explained by the presence of
rigidities in prices or wages’ adjustment. Bils and Klenow [4] have also empirically shown
how relevant sticky prices are. Consequently, taking into account both distortions in a
monetary policy model can help matching both theoretical and empirical conclusions.
The second underlying observation is that, in most interesting economies including a
monopolistic market environment, the optimal decision of an agent depends on the actions
of others. Indeed, when the market is subject to imperfect competition, a firm will have
to raise its price when it expects the other firms to do so. By increasing its price without
considering the actions of other firms, it will lose market shares. So a firm makes its price
setting decision not only according to its own expectations about the fundamentals, but
also its expectations about what other firms will do based on all its available information.
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It turns out that strategic complementarities matter.
The presence of both frictions (price stickiness and heterogeneous information among
firms) makes inflation too costly to social welfare in the sense that it increases price
dispersion across firms, and when prices are strategic complements, both frictions lead to
larger dispersion in prices which is inevitably detrimental to welfare as it amplifies the cost
of inflation. By releasing information that is common knowledge to all firms especially
information about its target for inflation, the central bank may help reducing forecasts
errors and price dispersion across firms by providing a focal point to agents’ expectations.
These considerations might therefore justify the adoption of an inflation targeting regime
by a central bank.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the related
literature about inflation targeting, and central banks’ transparency. Section 3 presents
our model which associates heterogeneous information about the state of the economy
and strategic complementarities, as well as Calvo’s sticky prices assumption. Section 4
presents and analyzes our results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Inflation targeting is a recent monetary policy strategy which has been first implemented
by the Reserve Bank of New Zeland in 1990, followed by more than twenty developed
and developing countries. This monetary policy regime is mainly characterized by a clear
announcement by the central bank of its inflation target that is its primary objective, as
well as a high degree of transparency and accountability.
In practice, inflation targeting is never strict but always flexible in the sense that
central banks that targeting inflation also give some weight to stabilizing the real economy,
either implicitly or explicitly (Svensson [23], [25]). So, the objective of a flexible inflation
targeting central bank is to minimize the gaps between current inflation and the target,
as well as putting some weight to stabilize the output gap3. A large empirical literature
including Roger and Stone [20], and Levin et al. [15] finds positive effects of the inflation
target on the variability of inflation and output, in the countries that adopted inflation
3The gap between current output and the long-run flexible output.
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targeting. Demertzis and Viegi [7] and [8], argue that one of the main advantages in
adopting a target for inflation is that, it serves as a focal point for agents’ inflation
expectations4. In the case of UK, King [14] shows that inflation expectations of agents
have been effectively anchored to the Bank of England’s inflation target. The success
of inflation targeting is therefore generally approved in monetary theory, and no country
has abandoned this monetary policy after adopting it except to join a monetary union
(Svensson [25]). As noted earlier, inflation targeting central banks are on average the
most transparent central banks. The fact that a central bank announces its target for
inflation, is typically a kind of transparency in itself.
The literature about central bank’s transparency has grown up quickly, and is usually
in favor of transparency. Transparency reduces uncertainty between the central bank and
the private sector about the economy’s statement, and can therefore improve monetary
policy efficiency (Geraats [10]). Demertzis and Hughes Hallett [6] pointed out that the
increase in central bank transparency decreases the volatility of inflation and output, even
though their average levels have not been affected.
Recently however and following the influential work of Morris and Shin [17], a par-
ticular issue has been raised about the welfare implications of disclosing more and better
public information to the private sector. The latter authors argue that in an environment
characterized by strategic complementarities and agents having heterogeneous informa-
tion about the fundamentals, more precise public information can be harmful to social
welfare in the sense that, private agents put too large attention to this information com-
pared to its real value. Consequently, agents overreact to public information and make
the economy more sensitive to inevitable forecasts errors in the public information. This
overreaction would be an increasing function of strategic complementarities. Their argu-
4These authors analyze how an inflation target serves as a focal point for agents’ expectations, when
the central bank may lack credibility. Particularly they found that an explicit inflation target may provide
agents with better anchors for coordinating their expectations in the case where no great shock affects
the economy, or where all other available public information is very unclear, letting the inflation target
as the only clear public information. While these authors focus their analysis on the coordinating effect
of an inflation target, our analysis mainly focuses on the welfare implications of adopting an inflation
target when the central bank is sufficiently credible, by providing the conditions under which this regime
should be adopted.
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ment has received a special attention in the academic literature. Some authors including
Svensson [24] and Woodford [30], have challenged Morris and Shin’s result by scrutinizing
their own model and conclude that their argument is actually in favor of transparency.
Hellwig [12] and Roca [19] have shown in fully micro-founded frameworks, that releasing
more accurate public information is welfare increasing. While the literature in the spirit
of Morris and Shin [17] assesses the welfare effects of transparency when the role of the
central bank is just releasing or withholding information, James and Lawler [13] modified
the basic framework of Morris and Shin, by providing a setting which jointly accounts for
the communication and action of the central bank. They found that more precise public
information unambiguously decreases social welfare.
The welfare effects of transparency in an environment which takes into account both
the action and communication of the central bank, have also been addressed in rele-
vant monetary policy models. For instance, Walsh [28] argues that when the role of the
monetary authority is both to stabilize the economy through its instrument, as well as
releasing information, transparency provides more precise information to firms, but at the
same time makes their decisions more sensitive to the central bank’s forecast errors. Con-
sequently, inflation may become more volatile when the central bank announces its policy
targets5. Baeriswyl and Cornand [2] point out that the welfare effects of transparency,
depend on how public information interacts with the policy action. They found that pro-
viding firms with more public information by directly making announcements is harmful
to price dispersion, because it impairs the trade-off the central bank faces between the
output gap and price dispersion. By contrast, the information conveyed by the monetary
instrument is welfare improving when firms’ coordination is highly valuable.
3 The economy
In this section, we present the features of the Calvo’s sticky prices model, that is combined
with the assumption that agents have heterogeneous private information about the state
of the economy. The basis of the model is the same as in Angeletos and La’O [1]. However,
we extend the model by deriving the inflation expectations made by adjusting price agents,
5Hence, his argument supports Morris and Shin’s.
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and allow for monetary authority’s intervention. While these authors mainly care about
higher order expectations to explain price inertia, our analysis focuses exclusively on
the welfare consequences of adopting an explicit target for inflation as a framework for
monetary policy. Furthermore, the informational structure of our model is fundamentaly
different from the latter paper.
Our setting is close to Walsh [28]’ framework in the sense that he also considers
both frictions (price stickiness and heterogeneous information among agents) in his trans-
parency effects’ analysis. However, his approach does not explicitly account for the impact
of the interaction of both strategic complementarities and sticky prices on the choice fac-
ing the central bank in its policy strategy, nor taking into account an explicit target for
inflation in the welfare function. Our approach is also different from Baeriswyl and Cor-
nand [2] as these authors analyze welfare effects of transparency in a flexible price model.
Moreover, their analysis of transparency focuses on the impact of economic transparency,
while the analysis presented in this paper highlights the impact of political transparency
(inflation target) on social welfare. Nevertheless as in Walsh, and Baeriswyl and Cor-
nand, we consider that the monetary instrument has a dual role. It serves not only as an
action to stabilize the economy, but also provides indirectly to firms, the central bank’s
estimation about the state of the economy.
The economy is characterized by a representative household, a continuum of monopo-
listic competitive firms, and a central bank. The central bank of the economy is the sole
source of public information, and has developed a credible reputation in achieving low
and stable inflation. Moreover, it partially controls the nominal aggregate output through
its monetary instrument, and seeks to maximize the utility function of the representative
household, as well as keeping inflation within its band’s target6. In addition, we allow
the economy to be hit by two types of stochastic shocks that are a mark-up shock and a
demand shock. We first present the features of the representative household maximizing
its utility function according to its budget constraint. Then we present the problem the
firms face and therefore their price setting behavior, and finally we present the monetary
policy’s side of the economy. Throughout the paper, the lower case letters denote log
6This assumption will be explained later in the text.
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deviations from steady state values of the variable denoted by the corresponding capital
letter.
3.1 The representative household
The household chooses his consumption level and labor supply, to maximize its utility





U(Ct, Nt) = logCt −Nt, (1)
where Nt is the labor supplied by the household, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.











where Ci,t is the differentiated good produced by firm i, and θ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between differentiated goods. The lower this elasticity, the more firms can
increase their prices and hence, their mark-up stemming from their market power as goods
become less substitutable.
Modern macroeconomic theory usually assumes that this elasticity is constant for all
differentiated goods. However and following Steinsson [21], we assume that θ is changing
throughout time. One can interpret this assumption by the fact that the variety of
products produced in the economy as well as their substitutability are constantly changing.
It turns out that the resulting monopoly power and hence, the desired mark-up of firms
also vary throughtout time. This assumption will be helpful by allowing us to introduce a
7For simplicity, we focus here on commodities market and abstract from capital accumulation and
assets market, so that there is no saving at equilibrium. One could argue that this is a restriction,
because assets market is the most concerned about monetary policy. We will not argue against this
restriction but we solely consider commodities market because our purpose in this paper is to focus on
the effects of monetary policy (inflation target) on the price setting behavior of firms.
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mark-up shock in the model. Given the aggregate consumption, the household’s demand















is the aggregate price index.
3.2 Firms and price setting behavior
Each firm i produces its differentiated good’s output according to the following function :
Yi,t = Ai,tN
η
i ,t , (4)
where Ai,t is the specific productivity disturbance of firm i, Ni,t the labor supplied by the
household to firm i, and η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of diminishing returns in production.
The ressource constraint implies that Yi,t = Ci,t for all i and hence aggregate output is
given by Yt = Ct. It follows that the nominal aggregate output is then given by :
D = PtCt, (5)
where D is the level of nominal aggregate output that the central bank tries to control with
its monetary instrument. Assume that prices are flexible, and current nominal output is
common knowledge when firms decide to set prices. It follows that the optimal price
setting by firm i at time t is given by :
p∗i ,t = φ+mci,t , (6)
where φ = θ
θ−1 is the monopolistic mark-up, and mci,t is firm i’s nominal marginal cost
at the end of the period and is given by :






where wt is the nominal competitive wage rate. Household’s optimal condition for work
implies that :
wt − pt = ct. (8)
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From (3) :
ci,t−ct = −θ(pi,t−pt). (9)
Market clearing conditions require that : ci,t = yi,t, and ct = yt. Finally from (5), one
gets the expression of real aggregate output relative to its steady state value (normalized
here to 0)8:
yt = dt − pt, (10)
where dt denotes the log expression of nominal aggregate output. Combining these con-
ditions provides the optimal flexible price of firm i at t :
p∗i ,t = (1− k)dt + kpt + ui,t , (11)
where k = 1− 1
η+(1−η)θ ∈ (0, 1) defines the degree of strategic complementarities in pricing
decisions, and where :
ui,t =
η
η + (1− η)θφ−
1
η + (1− η)θai,t
is an error term representing a linear combination of firms’ mark-up and productivity
disturbance. As we said earlier, the assumption of stochastic elacticity of substitution
among goods allows us to consider a mark-up shock into our model. The mark-up shock
in the model is thus mainly caused by the fluctuations in this elasticity. It is well known
in the literature that these shocks generate a trade-off between stabilizing output and
inflation, and then, cannot be offset by the central bank9. To keep the analysis as simple
as possible, we consider solely the mark-up and normalize the error term ui,t, letting it
to be log-normally distributed across firms, and to generate an aggregate mark-up shock
with mean zero :
u ∼ N(0, σ2u) .
Firms will then have to consider their expectations about the realization of the aggregate
mark-up shock in their pricing decisions. Under the flexible prices assumption, all firms
8Hence, this is also our mesure of the real output gap.
9In the presence of both mark-up and demand shocks, the central bank offsets the demand shock, and
leans against the wind in response to mark-up shock according to the precision of its signals on these
shocks (see Baeriswyl and Cornand [2]).
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will set the same optimal price as in (11). However, following Calvo [5], we postulate that
at every period t, only a fraction (1−ω) of firms can adjust their prices, while the remaining
fraction ω of firms keep their prices constant (ω ∈ (0, 1)). If firm i can adjust its price at
time t, the price it will set is equal to its current expectation of the weighted average of









where Ei,t denotes the expectations based on information available to firm i at period
t. By combining (11) and (12), one gets the optimal price set by a firm having the
opportunity to adjust its price at t :
p∗i ,t = (1− βω)
∞∑
j=0
(βω)j [(1− k)Ei,t dt+j + kEi,t pt+j + Ei,t ut+j] . (13)
Note that before adjusting its price, the firm observes neither the aggregate price level nor
the nominal aggregate demand and the aggregate mark-up shock. The adjusting firms
will set different prices because their expectations are based on different information sets.
Re-writing (13) recursively yields :
p∗i ,t = (1− βω)Ei,t [(1− k)dt + kpt + ut] + (βω)Ei,t p∗i ,t+1 . (14)
Let pi∗i ,t = p
∗
i ,t−pt−1 be the inflation generated by adjusting firm i, where pt−1 denotes the
last period’s aggregate log price level. Let pi∗t be the average inflation across the adjusting
firms at time t, and pit be the current aggregate inflation rate. The current aggregate
price level is given by :




p∗i ,t. Hence,(15) implies that p¯
∗
t − pt = ω(p¯∗t − pt−1) and that :
pit = pt − pt−1 = (1− ω)(p¯∗t − pt−1) = (
1− ω
ω
)(p¯∗t − pt). (16)
Assuming that all current information is observed at the end of each period t implies that
each adjusting firm in t+1 will set the same price as other adjusting firms. Hence we have
Ei,t p
∗




By combining (14),(16) and the definition of pi∗i ,t, one gets after some manipulation :






where pi∗t = p¯∗t − pt−1. According to equation (17), an adjusting firm i will base its
price decision on its expectations about what other adjusting firms are choosing (hence
on average inflation), its expectations about current nominal aggregate output and on
mark-up shock, as well as its expectations about the future current inflation.
3.3 The features of monetary policy and the nominal aggregate
output
We now turn to the features of monetary policy in our model. The monetary authority is
represented by a central bank which maximizes the utility function of the representative





Woodford [29] has derived the second order approximation of the household’s utility in
a fully microfounded Calvo model, and has shown that this utility function is consistent





λ(yt − y∗t )2 + pi2t
]
,
where y∗t is the central bank’s efficient level of output gap, and λ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
weight the central bank attributes to output gap stabilization. Note that this loss function
explicitly takes the efficient level of output gap as a target, and implicitly takes zero as
the target for inflation. The presence of y∗t in the loss function means that the central has
an incentive to push output above its natural level, creating an inflation bias a` la Barro-
Gordon [3]. However, there is no such incentive in our setup. As stressed by Svensson [22],
it is a general consensus that inflation targeting central banks do not normally have any
ambitious output target that exceeds the potential output10. Otherwise, the assumption
10Hence, the central bank’s output target is not subject to choice, but is simply given by the capacity
level of production.
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of zero inflation target is not realistic in the short-run. Although under credible inflation
targeting the long-run inflation target is zero as pointed by Walsh [27], the simultaneous
presence of frictions such as price stickiness and heterogeneous information, gives rationale
for a non-zero inflation target in the short-run. Hence, we modify the above loss-function






λy2t + (pit − pi∗)2
]
. (18)
Equation (18) thus represents the standard period loss function of an inflation targeting
central bank. Inflation is stabilized around its target value pi∗, while output is stabilized
around its natural level.
However, we are interested in an inflation targeting central bank that has an inflation band
target. In other words, the central bank considered here has the objective to keep current
inflation within a band target11. Such an argument is usually put forward to explain the
need of central bank’s flexibility, on achieving other macroeconomic variables’ stability
in an incertain environment. Let [pi1, pi2] be the interval of that band with pi2 > pi1. Let
pi1 = pi
∗−ρ, and pi2 = pi∗+ρ be the boundaries of the band with pi∗ denoting the mid-point
of the band, and ρ normally distributed : ρ ∼ N(0, σ2ρ).
This specification of the band target means that the width of the band may change
over time for instance, due to economic conditions. However, firms don’t know precisely
where the monetary authority wishes to stabilize inflation within the band, but are aware
that they have to focus their attention on this band target. When the central bank does
not explicitly announce its band target to the public, firms face complete uncertainty
about the intention of the central bank in stabilizing inflation, and only focus on their
private information in assessing the economy.
Considering inflation being inside this defined band target in the loss function implies






λy2t + 2(pit − pi∗)2 + 2ρ2
]
. (19)
To make things simpler later on and in order to highlight the deviations of inflation from
11In practice, most of the inflation targeting central banks prefer a band rather than a point target in
their design of the policy objective.
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2 + (pi1 − pit)2 + (pi2 − pit)2
]
. (20)
The central bank then faces two options in choosing its monetary policy strategy: either
to adopt an inflation targeting regime, or to be a non-inflation targeter. One must note
that any central bank has in practice an inflation target it wishes to reach, irrespective of
whether it announces it clearly to the public or not. As in Demertzis and Viegi [7], we call
a central bank that clearly announces its target for inflation an “ inflation targeter ”, and
identify a central bank that does not make an attempt to explicitly communicate its target
to the public as a “ non-inflation targeter ”. Let I be the central bank’s instrument with
which it minimizes its per-period loss-function, as well as controls partially the nominal
aggregate output. The monetary transmission mechanism from I to the nominal aggregate
output is given by :
dt = I + vt, (21)
with vt a demand disturbance normally distributed :
vt ∼ N(0, σ2v) .
3.4 Informational structure of the economy
Two aggregate shocks hit the economy: the mark-up shock ut, and the demand shock
vt. Each of these shocks is serially and mutually uncorrelated, and both the central bank
and firms act before observing the current values of these shocks. They receive however
idiosyncratic signals about these shocks before for the central bank to set its instrument,
and for adjusting firms to set prices. The central bank receives private signals about
mark-up and demand shocks, which allows it to estimate the true realization of these
shocks before setting its instrument. These private signals are centered on the real values
of the shocks with some error terms normally, identically and independently distributed :
ucb,t = ut + εcb,t
vcb,t = vt + st ,
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where εcb ∼ N(0, σ2ε) and st ∼ N(0, σ2s).
The instrument of the central bank is adjusted in a manner consistent with keeping
current inflation within the band target. Hence, the instrument the central bank will set
is a linear combination of its private signals on shocks, as well as its inflation target12:
I = α1ucb + α2vcb + α3pi2, (22)
where α1, α2 and α3 represent respectively optimal monetary coefficients the central
bank chooses in response to the mark-up shock, the demand shock, as well as optimal
adjustment to achieve its target.
On the other side, each firm i also gets a private signal on the mark-up shock. This signal
is private information to firm i in the sense that, it is unobserved by any other firm.
So, individual firms have potentially different information about the shock. This private
signal is centered on the true value of the mark-up shock, with an error term normally,
identically and independently distributed among firms :
uit = ut + εit ,
with :
εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε i) .
3.5 Sequence of events
The game is structured as follows. First, the central bank perfectly knows the inflation
band target it has to reach. The reaction of its monetary instrument partially depends
on this target. Two shocks hit the economy. The central bank receives private signals
about these shocks, and takes them into account before setting its instrument. The
instrument depends not only on the target for inflation, but also on the signals of the
central bank on the aggregate mark-up and demand disturbances. The central bank then
sets its instrument and makes it observable by firms. Firms also receive a private signal
on mark-up shock. In addition, they observe the monetary instrument and are aware
12As the central bank adjusts its instrument with respect to both pi1 and pi2 with the same coefficient
α3, it is convenient to consider just one boundary of the band in the instrument so as to avoid redundance.
Here we consider pi2.
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that via this instrument, the central bank optimally responds to aggregate disturbances
with respect to its private signals, but also has the objective to keep current inflation
within its target. So, firms are aware that this instrument depends on the central bank’s
target for inflation, as well as its signals about the macroeconomic disturbances. However,
without any explicit announcement of the central bank about its target and/or its private
signals about the shocks, firms cannot perfectly infer the central bank’s target or its
signals on shocks. Indeed, the movements of the instrument will be ambiguous for them
unless they have more information about that. Thus, according to their private signal
about the mark-up shock, the monetary instrument and any other information the central
bank may disclose, the adjusting firms rationally set their prices and form their inflation
expectations. Finally households supply labor, demand products for consumption and
production takes place.
4 Optimal monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the welfare implications of adopting an inflation target within
our model. To do so, we first present the equilibrium strategy of adjusting firms under
non-inflation and inflation targeting respectively, as well as the welfare losses that stem
from both regimes. Secondly, we compare these welfare losses for different alternatives
of the parameters of our model. The interaction of both strategic complementarities and
sticky prices, will then allow us to derive implications for optimal monetary policy.
4.1 Optimal policy under non-inflation targeting regime
We first present the equilibrium strategy of adjusting firms, and secondly the expected
loss function of such a regime.
4.1.1 Equilibrium strategy
If the central bank is a “non-inflation targeter”, the only public information firms face
before setting their prices is the monetary instrument. However as said before, even
though firms observe this instrument, without any explicit announcement by the central
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bank, they cannot perfectly infer the information conveyed in this instrument that is,
the central bank’s target for inflation, as well as its private signals on macroeconomic
disturbances. So firms base their optimal choices only on their private signals about the
mark-up shock, and the observable instrument. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of the
adjusting firm i is a linear combination of its private information on the mark-up shock,
and the central bank’s instrument13 :
pi∗i ,t = γ1ui,t +γ2I, (23)
with :
γ1 =
(1− ωβ) [(1− k)O21 +O11]
1− k(1− ω)O11 ,
γ2 =
−(1− ωβ)(1− k)− (1− α3pi∗) [(1− ωβ)((1− k)O22 +O12) + kO12γ1(1− ω)]
k(1− ω)− 1 .
Aggregating over all adjusting firms and multiplying by (1 − ω), we obtain the current
aggregate inflation rate as a linear combination of the actual realization of the mark-up
shock, and the policy instrument :
pit = (1− ω)pi∗ = γ˜1ut + γ˜2I, (24)
where γ˜1 = (1− ω)γ1, and γ˜2 = (1− ω)γ2.
4.1.2 Welfare function under non-inflation targeting
We now return to our central bank’s objective function which is to minimize the variance








2 + (pi1 − pit)2 + (pi2 − pit)2
]
.
Let$1 = E [(pi1 − pit)2] be the deviation of current inflation from pi1, and$2 = E [(pi2 − pit)2]
the deviation from pi2. Using (23) and expressing these components of inflation variability
in terms of the underlying stochastic variables, we obtain :





s) + (α3γ˜2 + 1)
2σ2ρ ,









s) + (α3γ˜2 − 1)2σ2ρ .
Using (10),(20) and (23), we deduce the variability of the real output gap which yields :
var(yt) = [α1(1− γ˜2)− γ˜1]2 σ2u+[α1(1− γ˜2)]2 σ2ε+[α2(1− γ˜2) + 1]2 σ2v+[α2(1− γ˜2)]2 σ2s+[α3(1− γ˜2)]2 σ2ρ .
As λ is the weight the central bank attributes to output stabilization, (1 − λ) is the
weight the central bank attributes to inflation stabilization. The unconditional expected




[λvar(yt) + (1− λ)($1 +$2)] . (25)
4.2 Optimal policy under inflation targeting regime
We proceed here as in the previous subsection. After characterizing the equilibrium
strategy of the adjusting firms, we derive the welfare loss function that emerges from this
regime.
4.2.1 Equilibrium strategy
We now consider that the central bank is an “ inflation targeter ”. As argued earlier, this
means that it announces explicitly its band target to the public. The announcement of
the central bank’s objectives for instance its target for inflation, is a key component of
political transparency. We also assume that the central bank discloses its private signal
on the demand shock to the public14. Thus, not only does the central bank announce
its target for inflation, but it also reveals its forecasts on the demand disturbance to the
private sector. Inflation targeter therefore increases both political (through the target)
and economic (through its signal on the demand shock) transparency in the economy15.
14In practice, inflation targeting central banks are more transparent than non-targeters, and thus not
only explicitly announce their inflation targets, but also make great efforts to disclose their forecasts on
economic assessment.
15Demertzis and Hughes Hallett [6] gather both quantitative targets such as the target for inflation, and
the central bank’s forecasts as components of economic transparency. However, the analysis presented
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This has a crucial implication about the informational structure of the economy. The
explicit announcement by the central bank of the target for inflation as well as its signal
on the demand shock, will lead to perfect transparency that is, removing any asymmetric
information between the central bank and firms. The rationale of this implication is
straightforward. As the monetary instrument is a function of both mark-up and demand
shocks as well as the target for inflation and is observed by firms, by announcing the
inflation target and its signal on the demand shock, the central bank allows firms to
perfectly infer its signal on the mark-up shock. So, firms no longer need additional
information from the central bank to perfectly understand all information it has about the
state of the economy. Therefore, firms will better estimate the actual realization of these
shocks in their pricing decisions, and expectations would be better anchored. The optimal
decision of adjusting firm i will be a linear combination of all its available information
that is, its private signal on the mark-up shock, the target for inflation, the central bank’s
signal on the demand shock, as well as the observable monetary instrument16 :
pi∗i ,t = b1ui,t +b2vcb + b3pi2 + b4I, (26)
with :
b1 =
(1− ωβ) [(1− k)Γ21 + Γ11]
1− k(1− ω)Γ11 ,
b2 =
−(1− ωβ) [(1− k)Γ22 + Γ12]− kb1(1− ω)Γ12
k(1− ω)− 1 ,
b3 =
−(1− pi∗) [(1− ωβ)((1− k)Γ23 + Γ13) + kb1(1− ω)Γ13]
k(1− ω)− 1 ,
b4 =
−(1− ωβ)(1− k)− (1− α3pi∗) [(1− ωβ)((1− k)Γ24 + Γ14) + kb1(1− ω)Γ14]
k(1− ω)− 1 .
in this paper follows Geraats [10] by considering the target for inflation as part of political transparency,
and the central bank’s signals on the shocks as an aspect of economic transparency.
16See the appendix for the details of equilibrium calculation.
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As before, aggregating over all adjusting firms and multiplying by (1 − ω), yields the
current aggregate inflation rate as linear combination of the actual realization of mark-
up shock, central bank’s signal on demand shock, the inflation target and the policy
instrument :
pit = (1− ω)pi∗t = b¯1ut + b¯2vcb + b¯3pi2 + b¯4I, (27)
where b¯1 = (1− ω)b1, b¯2 = (1− ω)b2, b¯3 = (1− ω)b3, and b¯4 = (1− ω)b4.
4.2.2 Welfare function under inflation targeting
The method is exactly similar to what has been used for the non-inflation targeter. Let
∆1 = E [(pi1 − pit)2] be the deviation of current inflation from pi1, and ∆2 = E [(pi2 − pit)2]
the deviation from pi2. By expressing them in terms of stochastic variables using (26),
one obtains :
∆1 = (α1b¯4 + b¯1)
2σ2u + (α1b¯4)
2σ2ε + (α2b¯4 + b¯2)
2(σ2v + σ
2
s) + (α3b¯4 + b¯3 + 1)
2σ2ρ ,
and
∆2 = (α1b¯4 + b¯1)
2σ2u + (α1b¯4)
2σ2ε + (α2b¯4 + b¯2)
2(σ2v + σ
2
s) + (α3b¯4 + b¯3 − 1)2σ2ρ .























The unconditional expected loss-function of the inflation targeting central bank is there-




[λvarT (yt) + (1− λ)(∆1 + ∆2)] . (28)
4.3 Non-inflation targeting versus inflation targeting regime
In what follows, we analyze to what extent the central bank must explicitly adopt a tar-
get for inflation according to the model we consider. Since we have calculated the loss
functions stemming from both policy regimes, we now compare both regimes, by applying
a cost-benefit analysis as in Baeriswyl and Cornand [2]. We compare the unconditional
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expected loss of the non-inflation targeting central bank to the expected loss of the in-
flation targeting central bank. The ratio between the expected loss of the non-inflation




When this ratio is greater than one i.e. E(LNIT ) > E(LIT ), it is optimal for the central
bank to be an “inflation targeter”.
By contrast, if this ratio is less than one , it is optimal for the central bank to be a “non-
inflation targeter”. We present this ratio to assess the impact of the main parameters
driving our model that is, strategic complementarities and price stickiness. To this end,
we first present the ratio as a function a price stickiness for three values of strategic
complementarities. Then we present the ratio as a function of the precision of firms’
private information on mark-up shock, in order to assess its role in the dynamics of the
model. Finally, we present the ratio as a function of the precision of the central bank’s
information about the mark-up shock.
4.3.1 Interaction between strategic complementarities and sticky prices
Figure 1 presents the ratio of losses as a function of price stickiness, for three alternative
values of strategic complementarities. The result is computed with the following values
of the remaining parameters : σ2u = 1, σ
2
v = 1, σ
2
ρ = 1, σ
2
ε = 0.2, σ
2
ε i = 0.2, σ
2
s = 0.2,
pi∗ = 2, λ = 0.3, and β = 0.9917. We concentrate our attention on the extreme values of
the parameters, as those are the most interesting cases to study.
Figure 1 shows that strategic complementarities play a fundamental role in the welfare
analysis. When the degree of strategic complementarities is low (k = 0.2), it is always
optimal for the central bank to be an inflation targeter whatever the degree of price
stickiness.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When strategic complementarities
are low, firms do not really care about the actions taken by other firms in their pricing
decisions, and focus on their private information to match the fundamental as well as
the central bank’s target for inflation. The distortion which may stem from the need to
17This is the standard value of the discount factor β, in line with quaterly data.
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match the others’ choices is therefore removed, and firms focus on achieving central bank’s
target, as they know that this is the main objective of the central bank. By announcing
its primary objective as well as its signal on the demand shock, the central bank allows
firms to make better expectations on the mark-up shock, and to anchor these expectations
to the credible inflation target. Hence, the central bank reduces its loss by providing to
firms a focal point to coordinate their expectations.
However, when strategic complementarities become very high (k = 0.8), matching
others’ actions matters and adds another issue to firms’ price setting decisions. In this
case, adopting an inflation target depends on the degree of price stickiness. The central
bank should opt for an inflation targeting regime only if the degree of price stickiness
is very high. The rationale for this result is the following. High degree of strategic
complementarities implies that firms act not only to match fundamentals, but also to
match the actions of other firms. Therefore, any public announcement made by the
central bank will lead to reducing strategic uncertainty about the actions of other firms.
In line with the Morris and Shin’s effect, firms overreact to the announcements made
by the central bank that is, its target for inflation, as well as its signal on the demand
shock. Indeed as stressed earlier, both announcements allow firms to perfectly understand
the central bank’s signal on the mark-up shock, and then exacerbate their response to
this mark-up shock. If prices are flexible enough, this behavior will be harmful to social
welfare and therefore, adopting an inflation targeting regime is not optimal. Nevertheless,
this result does not hold if prices are strongly sticky. Indeed, in this case firms do not
exacerbate their response to the mark-up shock, but rather they mainly act according to
the past period inflation. The same argument of high strategic complementarities leads
firms to mainly base their decisions on past price level behavior, as they expect other
adjusting firms to do the same. However, the reaction to the mark-up shock still exists,
but its importance is largely reduced by firms’ attention to past period price behavior.
Two main effects thus arise from this configuration. The “overreaction effect” due to
more information about the mark-up shock18, and the “anchoring effect” of the inflation
18As the central bank reveals its target for inflation as well as its information on the demand shock,
firms can therefore understand the reason behind the instrument’s setting and then have more information
about the mark-up shock, as they can perfectly infer the central bank’s signal on it.
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target. By announcing its current target for inflation, the central bank provides firms
with a focal point in their backward looking expectations, by indicating the extent to
which they should be backward looking. Consequently, the central bank can easily deal
with the underlying price dispersion towards its target due to the overreaction effect on
the mark-up shock, without increasing too strongly its instrument.
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k =  0.20
k=  0.50
k=  0.80
Figure 1: The ratio E(LNIT )
E(LIT )
as a function of price stickiness
4.3.2 Optimal policy as a function of the precision of firms’s private infor-
mation
Figure 2 presents the ratio as a function of the precision of firms’s private information
about the mark-up shock for three values of price stickiness. The remaining parameters
values are : σ2u = 1, σ
2
v = 1, σ
2
ρ = 1, σ
2
ε = 0.2, k = 0.2, σ
2
s = 0.2, β = 0.99, pi
∗ = 2, and
λ = 0.3.
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w =  0.20
w =  0.50
w =  0.80
Figure 2: The ratio E(LNIT )
E(LIT )
as a function of the precision of firms’s information on the
mark-up shock
The figure again shows that when the degree of price stickiness is very high (w = 0.8),
the monetary authority should explicitly adopt a target for inflation with respect to firms’
information. By contrast, when prices are flexible enough (w = 0.2), the optimal choice
depends on the precision of firms’ private information about the mark-up shock. When
firms have access to relatively precise information on the mark-up shock, the announce-
ment of the target and the central bank’s signal on the demand shock will not lead to
overreaction of firms to the mark-up shock even in the case of high strategic complemen-
tarities, because firms already have precise information on it. They only focus on the
central bank’s target, and as their information about the fundamental is quite precise,
expectations will quickly match the target.
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4.3.3 Optimal policy as a function of the precision of central bank’s informa-
tion
We now present the result according to the precision of central bank’s information about
the mark-up shock. Figure 3 presents this result for three values of price stickiness, and
the following values of other parameters : σ2u = 1, σ
2
v = 1, σ
2
ρ = 1, σ
2
ε i = 0.4, k = 0.7,
σ2s = 0.2, β = 0.99, pi
∗ = 2, and λ = 0.3.
 






















w =  0.10
w =  0.50
w =  0.90
Figure 3: The ratio E(LNIT )
E(LIT )
as a function of the precision of central bank’s information
on the mark-up shock
The figure shows that when prices are very flexible (w = 0.1), adopting an inflation
target is never optimal with respect to the precision of central bank’s information on the
mark-up shock. The analysis presented above stresses the importance of price stickiness,
as well as both “overreaction effect” and “anchoring effect” of the target in the choice
of inflation targeting. However, even in the case of high price stickiness (w = 0.9), the
optimal policy will depend on the precision of central bank’s information about the mark-
up shock. Indeed, when central bank’s information is too imprecise, inflation targeting
26
may be harmful to social welfare. The detrimental consequences of the overreaction
effect of adjusting firms to mark-up shock, dominates the positive impact of the target’s
anchoring effect. Conversely, when central bank’s information about the mark-up shock
is quite precise, explicitly adopting a target for inflation would be optimal as it bears the
potentially negative impact of the overreaction effect. With more accurate central bank’s
information about the mark-up shock, firms’ reaction to the mark-up shock stemming
from explicit announcement, will no longer hamper social welfare, and therefore forecasts
errors are limited.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we theoretically analyze under what conditions should a central bank adopt
an inflation targeting regime. to this end, we use a new keynesian’s sticky prices framework
a` la Calvo [5], when the economy is characterized by heterogeneous information among
firms and strategic complementarities in price setting. The main contribution of this
paper is to highlight two key points in assessing our issue.
First, adopting an inflation targeting strategy depends on the sequential, but comple-
mentary importance of the different parameters of the model.
The analysis stresses that the degree of strategic complementarities is the first driving
force in the choice of an optimal monetary policy. When strategic complementarities are
low, the central bank must adopt an inflation targeting regime as a framework for its
monetary policy, regardless the values of other parameters in the economy. By contrast,
when strategic complementarities are quite strong, optimal policy in that case mainly
depends on the degree of price stickiness, followed by the relevance of the central bank’s
information about the fundamentals of the economy.
Two main effects arise from this situation namely, the “overreaction effect” to mark-up
shocks, and the “anchoring effect” of the inflation target. When prices are very flexible, it
is never optimal for the central bank to be an inflation targeter, because the overreaction
effect of firms’ adjustment to mark-up shock dominates the target’s anchoring effect. This
overreaction effect to the mark-up shock amplifies firms reaction and as this shock cannot
be offset by the central bank, that hampers social welfare. Conversely when prices are
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strongly sticky, the anchoring effect of the target dominates the overreaction effect to the
mark-up shock and in the case where central bank’s information is relatively precise, then
adopting a target for inflation is optimal for monetary policy.
The second underlying key point is that, disseminating public information is essential
but not sufficient for assessing the positive impact of inflation targeting regime. The
information provided should be as accurate as possible, and this requires considerable
efforts in modeling and forecasting macroeconomic data. So, the main question to be
asked in assessing the positive effects of inflation targeting and hence transparency, is not
knowing to what extent public information has to be supplied, but rather how accurate
is this provided information. We then argue that, inflation targeting central banks must
make greater efforts in their macroeconomic forecasts analysis, in order to be more efficient
and to keep inflation targeting as the best practice in modern monetary policy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Linear equilibrium and signal extraction under non-inflation
targeting
We depart from the optimal decision of adjusting firm i given by :






Remember that the nominal aggregate output is defined as :
dt = I + vt .
By replacing this into the equation above, one obtains:






The serially uncorrelated shocks’ assumption implies that Ei,t pit+1 = 0. We then postulate
that the optimal choice facing adjusting firm i is a linear combination of its private signal
on the mark-up shock, as well as the observed monetary instrument :
pi∗i ,t = γ1ui,t +γ2I. (31)
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pricing behavior
of other adjusting firms. The conditional estimate of the average inflation by firm i is
therefore given by:
Ei,t (pi∗t ) = γ1Ei(ut) + γ2I .
Plugging this into (29) yields :
pi∗i ,t = k(1− ω)(γ1Ei(ut) + γ2I) + (1− βω)Ei,t [(1− k)(I + vt) + ut] . (32)
Otherwise, firm i estimates the real realization of the mark-up and demand shocks as well
as central bank’s target for inflation, conditional on its two signals. This signal extraction












where O = VouVo
−1
o is a 4 × 2 matrix . Vou denotes the covariance matrix between
the observed signals [uit, I] and the unobserved variables [ut, vt, pi1, pi2], and Voo is the
covariance matrix between the observed signals themselves. Signal extraction then gives
:
Ei(ut) = O11ui,t +O12(I − α3pi∗) ,
Ei(vt) = O21ui,t +O22(I − α3pi∗) ,
Ei(pi1) = O31ui,t +O32(I − α3pi∗) ,
Ei(pi2) = O41ui,t +O42(I − α3pi∗) .
Substituting Ei(ut) and Ei(vt) by their values in (31) yields :
pi∗i ,t = k(1− ω)(γ1(O11ui,t +O12(I − α3pi∗)) + γ2I) + (1− βω)(1− k)I
+(1− βω)(1− k)(O21ui,t +O22(I − α3pi∗)) + (1− βω)(O11ui,t +O12(I − α3pi∗)) .
Collecting the same elements and equating the coefficients with those in (30) gives after
some manipulations :
γ1 =
(1− ωβ) [(1− k)O21 +O11]
1− k(1− ω)O11 ,
and
γ2 =
−(1− ωβ)(1− k)− (1− α3pi∗) [(1− ωβ)((1− k)O22 +O12) + kO12γ1(1− ω)]
k(1− ω)− 1 .
By aggregating over all adjusting firms, it follows that :
pi∗t = γ1ut + γ2I .
Letting γ˜1 = (1 − ω)γ1 and γ˜2 = (1 − ω)γ2, one therefore obtains the current aggregate
inflation rate :
pit = (1− ω)pi∗t = γ˜1ut + γ˜2I .
A.2 Linear equilibrium and signal extraction under inflation
targeting
We still depart from the optimal decision of firm i and follow the same process as before :
pi∗i ,t = k(1− ω)Ei,t (pi∗t ) + (1− βω)Ei,t [(1− k)(I + vt) + ut] . (33)
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The equilibrium strategy of firm i is in this case a linear combination of its private signal
on mark-up shock, the central bank’s signal on demand shock, the target for inflation as
well as the policy instrument :
pi∗i ,t = b1ui,t +b2vcb,t +b3pi2 + b4I. (34)
The optimal weights b1, b2, b3 and b4 depend on firms’ expectations about the pricing
behavior of other adjusting firms. The conditional estimate of the average inflation by
firm i is therefore given by :
Ei,t (pi∗t ) = b1Ei(ut) + b2vcb + b3pi2 + b4I .
Plugging this into equation (32) yields :
pi∗i ,t = k(1− ω)(b1Ei(ut) + b2vcb + b3pi2 + b4I) + (1− βω)Ei,t [(1− k)(I + vt) + ut] . (35)
As the central bank announces explicitly its target to firms, they no longer need to infer
this target. So, Ei(pi1) = pi1 and Ei(pi2) = pi2. Therefore, firm i only estimates the real
values of mark-up and demand shocks conditional on its received signals. This signal











where Γ = ΛouΛo
−1
o is a 2 × 4 matrix. As before, Λou represents the covariance matrix
between the observed signals and the unobserved variables, and Λoo is the covariance
matrix between the observed signals themselves. It follows from signal extraction that :
Ei(ut) = Γ11ui,t +Γ12vcb + Γ13(pi2 − pi∗) + Γ14(I − α3pi∗) ,
Ei(vt) = Γ21ui,t +Γ22vcb + Γ23(pi2 − pi∗) + Γ24(I − α3pi∗) .
Replacing Ei(ut) and Ei(vt) by their values into (34) yields :
pi∗i ,t = k(1− ω)(b1(Γ11ui,t +Γ12vcb + Γ13(pi2 − pi∗) + Γ14(I − α3pi∗)) + b2vcb + b3pi2 + b4I)
+(1− βω)(1− k)I + (1− βω)(1− k)(Γ21ui,t +Γ22vcb + Γ23(pi2 − pi∗) + Γ24(I − α3pi∗))
+(1− βω)(Γ11ui,t +Γ12vcb + Γ13(pi2 − pi∗) + Γ14(I − α3pi∗)) .
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Collecting the same elements and equating coefficients with those in (33) gives :
b1 =
(1− ωβ) [(1− k)Γ21 + Γ11]
1− k(1− ω)Γ11 ,
b2 =
−(1− ωβ) [(1− k)Γ22 + Γ12]− kb1(1− ω)Γ12
k(1− ω)− 1 ,
b3 =
−(1− pi∗) [(1− ωβ)((1− k)Γ23 + Γ13) + kb1(1− ω)Γ13]
k(1− ω)− 1 ,
b4 =
−(1− ωβ)(1− k)− (1− α3pi∗) [(1− ωβ)((1− k)Γ24 + Γ14) + kb1(1− ω)Γ14]
k(1− ω)− 1 .
By aggregating over all adjusting firms, it follows that :
pi∗t = b1ut + b2vcb + b3pi2 + b4I .
Letting b¯1 = (1 − ω)b1, b¯2 = (1 − ω)b2, b¯3 = (1 − ω)b3 and b¯4 = (1 − ω)b4, one hence
obtains the current aggregate inflation rate :
pit = (1− ω)pi∗t = b¯1ut + b¯2vcb + b¯3pi2 + b¯4I .
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